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Quantitative easing does not address the fundamental
problems underpinning struggling western economies.
by Blog Admin
Quantitative easing has been adopted by a number of central banks in the wake of the global
financial crisis. John Doukas takes an in-depth look at the effects of quantitative easing,
arguing that it not only fails to increase real economic activity, it also increases unemployment
and encourages outsourcing to developing countries that offer higher rates of return. He
concludes that economic growth and job creation should be the priority of western
governments and not of central banks.
Since the global f inancial crisis erupted in 2007, central banks have been dealing with “tail”
risks arising f rom private (mortgage and consumer) and governments’ excessive leverage or the potential
f or disasters, such as the break-up of  the Eurozone. While these def ensive policies seem to have worked
in the short-run, their long-term results remain doubtf ul, if  not destabilising.
More recently, the task of  major central banks has shif ted towards promoting growth and job creation,
without having the ability to deliver on their promises. For example, the repeated Quantitative Easing (QE)
policies of  the US Federal Reserve in the af termath of  the global f inancial crisis, with similar actions by the
Bank of  England and the European Central Bank (ECB), have f ailed miserably to restore growth and reduce
unemployment. Unemployment remains at high levels in the US and is rising at an alarming rate in the
Eurozone, especially in southern European countries, with the state of  economic activity staying subdued
and f ar f rom the path of  recovery. Figure 1 below shows that since the collapse of  Lehman Brothers,
unemployment in the southern Eurozone is on the rise despite the ECB’s attempts at quantitative easing.
Figure 1 – Eurozone unemployment and bond yields
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Eurostat Reuters Graphic/Scott Barber 3/1/2012
Eurocurrency bloc core countries, France and Germany, are expected to barely grow in 2013. The
divergence in bond yields subsequent to the Lehman Brothers collapse mirrors the ECB’s inability to
maintain a unif orm interest rate policy across the Eurozone, suggesting that its inf luence on interest rates
is limited even in the short-run. ‘State/government money’ creation, as opposed to ‘private money’ or ‘bank-
based money’ creation has ‘no turbo power’, as conventionally some tend to believe. To put it dif f erently,
there is a transmission stickiness that prevents a central bank’s money supply increases f rom trickling
down to the economy. In sum, central banks have been pursuing multiple objectives using a f ew tools that
are both imperf ect and indirect to have a posit ive dent on the real economy.
As a result of  this new central bank policy trend, central banks have inf lated their balance sheets with
assets of  questionable quality, putting themselves at risk. For example, the G4 central bank assets (United
States, Eurozone, Japan and the UK), as the f ollowing f igure shows, account f or about 23 per cent of  their
combined GDP, while interest rates are near zero. The G4 central bank assets were approximately $3.5
trillion prior to the Lehman/AIG crisis meltdown. Today, they are approximately $9 trillion and rising. What is
interesting is that the same recipe has recently been adopted by the Bank of  Japan, result ing in a sharp
depreciation of  the Yen and raising concerns about potential currency wars among the major world
economies.
Figure 2 – G4 central bank assets as percentage of GDP
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream - Reuters Graphic/Scott Barber 3/2/2012
Last month, the US Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes sent a chilling signal to
the markets that another round of  QE was less likely, with stock markets responding nervously. Caref ul
interpretation of  the US Federal Reserve’s message suggests that is getting worried about the collateral
damage of  QE. That is, the expected “benef its” of  QE could backf ire by rising “cost and risks” if  f iscal
actions, required to restructure and grow the economy, continue to lag central bank actions in the US and
Europe.
This raises the natural question of  why central banks have not learned f rom past boom and busts (i.e. the
1930s, 2001 tech bubble, 2008 f inancial/mortgage crisis and other “rare” events)? It is well known that there
has never been a boom that is not linked with excessive money supply. Easy monetary policies consistently
lead to booms and then to busts simply because they reduce interest rates, the cost of  borrowing, f or
both (naïve/noisy) investors and governments that, in turn, raise private (i.e. durable goods, real estate)
and government (i.e. entit lements/voter grabbing programs) spending beyond their ability to meet their debt
obligations.
The practice of  expansionary monetary policy leads to capital misallocation as it f avours short- term
spending at the expense of  long-term spending (investing less in long-term projects). That is, it creates a
savings- investment gap that reduces the capital f ormation required f or the economy to grow, which renders
a high f raction of  its existing capital stock obsolete. This, low interest rate policy, an outcome of
quantitative easing, in turn, has an adverse ef f ect on productivity f orcing capital to migrate in
f oreign/emerging markets in order to realise higher returns. In other words, excessive money supply f ails to
increase real economic activity because it raises the labour cost while it lowers the cost of  capital.
Depressing yields at home, as a result of  quantitative easing, in an open economy setting, leads yield-
seeking investors into higher-risk investments such as emerging markets.
This asymmetrical ef f ect of  excessive quantitative easing has been overlooked by most, especially
Keynesian economists, who believe that lower interest rate policies have the power to lower unemployment
through greater spending. While quantitative easing, like expansionary f iscal policy, may increase aggregate
spending, this does not trickle down to the real economy because relative prices (labour vs. capital) work
against it. This results in higher rates of  unemployment with capital f lying to f oreign markets. A related
ef f ect is that f oreign economies, especially those with lower labour costs than western economies,
become more attractive places to invest because of  these lower costs and promising higher returns to
capital. That is, quantitative easing encourages outsourcing, as capital is excessively substituted f or
overseas labour causing jobs and product innovation to move of f shore. Imported goods and services f rom
these countries, then, become more attractive to western consumers because they are cheaper in
comparison to the ones locally produced resulting in great outf low of  capital, outsourcing and
unemployment. This vicious circle exacerbates the disadvantaged posit ion of  western economies as they
are f orced to continue relying on overseas lenders to meet their spending needs, leading to mounting
budget def icits and external debt.
Taking these ef f ects together, we can see that printing more money will not address the f undamental
problems underpinning struggling western economies. On the contrary, it has damaging ef f ects in the long-
run in terms of  capital accumulation, output, employment, innovation and living standards. What is even
more worrisome is that the “buying time” policy adopted by central banks in recent years has f ailed to boost
real economic activity, which, in turn, helps to exacerbate the indebtedness of  western economies. The only
choice lef t to central banks, in an attempt to regain their independence and reputation, is to stop yielding to
government pressures to address the structural economic problems governments need to deal with.
Growth – and job creation – needs to become the overwhelming preoccupation of  western governments
and not of  central banks.
Why not cut taxes, reduce government spending to boost private economic activity, and f inally restore the
lending-spending link of  the private sector instead of  central banks loading banks with reserves, and
hoping that they will provide credit to the private sector?
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